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Business Strategy and Cost of Bank Loans 
Abstract 
Following Miles and Snow’s Business Strategy (BS) topology, we find that banks impose 
relatively higher loan spreads for the firms that follow an Innovation-Oriented Business Strategy 
(IOBS). We further document that IOBS is positively associated with corporate risk measures such 
as variances in equity returns and returns on assets. Overall, our findings suggest that banks charge 
a higher cost of debt in anticipation of borrowers’ payback riskiness from an IOBS. 
JEL Classification:  G21, G32, O31 
Key Words: Business Strategy, cost of bank loan, loan spreads, prospectors, corporate risk 
  




Business Strategy (BS) refers to a set of actions and choices that a firm makes to place 
itself into the competitive market and perform in its best possible ways (Porter, 2008). 
Organizational literature offers several BS topologies. The Miles and Snow’s (1978, 2003) 
topology framework, among others, is one of the most popular and highly cited that classifies the 
firms into Prospectors, Defenders, and Analyzers sub-groups based on their rate of change in the 
same lines of products and markets. While other BS topology frameworks require surveys or 
interviews that are tough to replicate, Miles and Snow’s (1978, 2003) is based on archival data and 
easy to replicate. Also, the validity of Miles and Snow's (1978, 2003) framework has already been 
established by quite many studies. According to the classification, Prospectors are those firms who 
tend to be more innovative via higher expenditure on Research and Development (R&D). 
Likewise, Defenders focus less on innovation but more on enhancing existing production 
efficiency and their better distribution. Analyzers make a balance between the properties of both 
Prospectors and Defenders sub-groups. 
It is a well-established issue in financial economics that higher investment in R&D is 
beneficial for a firm in the long run, but it generates earlier investment uncertainty and puts a firm 
into the riskier position (e.g., see Kothari et al., 2002; Eberhart et al., 2004; Bernile et al., 2018). 
This study investigates whether the investors treat a firm differently for its innovation-oriented BS 
(i.e., Prospectors or IOBS) nature. We employ a large cross-section of syndicated bank loan data 
from Thomson Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) DealScan. Studying bank loans 
provides us with a very useful setup from several considerations. For instance, bank loans are 
historically known as one of the most important external funding sources for firms (Houston and 
James, 1996). Furthermore, banks can play roles as delegated monitors with a high amount of 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3841664
3 
 
information about the borrowers that is nearly impossible for any other investors or creditors 
(Myers, 1977; Berlin and Loeys, 1988). 
However, we hypothesize and find that banks charge significantly higher loan spreads from 
the borrowers who are Prospectors. We establish BS as a relevant corporate risk factor by 
confirming that it is positively associated with variances in return on assets, idiosyncratic risks, 
and variances in sales growth (Hilary and Hui, 2009; Jiang et al., 2020). Dennis et al. (2000) and 
Goss and Roberts (2011) argue that banks may also practice other options against a borrower’s 
risk profile, such as decreasing the loan amounts, imposing covenants, etc. Consistently, we find 
that banks reduce loan amounts and put more covenants in the loan contracts when a borrower is 
a Prospector. 
Our study contributes to the determinants of the cost of bank loans literature (e.g., Chava 
et al., 2009; Goss and Roberts, 2011; Hasan et al., 2014; Houston et al., 2014), as well as to the 
organizational literature of BS (e.g., Bentley et al., 2013; Higgins et al., 2015; Yuan et al., 2020). 
2. Data and methodology 
We collect bank loan data from Thomson Reuters LPC DealScan. Following extant 
literature (e.g., Chava et al., 2009; Valta, 2012; Nadauld et al., 2012; and Chava, 2014), we 
identify “all-in-drawn” (i.e., annual spread paid in basis point over London Inter-Bank Offered 
Rate – LIBOR) as the primary cost feature of bank loans. We also collect facility amount, loan 
maturity, and a set of loan-specific indicator variables that include term structure, revolver, 
takeover, LBO, merger, working capital, debt repayment, and corporate purpose for US public 
firms. Consistent with prior studies on BS (e.g., Higgins et al., 2015; Bentley et al., 2013; and 
Ittner et al., 1997), we first compute all the strategy component variables using a rolling average 
of the respective yearly ratios over the prior five years. We then rank each of the six variables by 
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quintiles within every two digits sic coded industry and year to construct our final composite BS 
variable. We assign a score of 5 for observations in the highest quintile, 4 for the second-highest 
quintile, and, as we advance, 1 for the bottom quintile observations within each industry-year 
group. The process works in reverse order for the sixth component (net property, plant, and 
equipment divided by total assets) of the strategy composite measure since prospectors tend to 
focus less on capital intensity. We set a 5(1) score to the observations in the lowest (highest) 
quintile. Finally, for each firm-year, we sum the scores of the six variables to construct a composite 
index. This summation process yields the highest value of 30 and the lowest value of 6 for the 
composite index, which is the main proxy for a firm’s BS. We consider firms as Defenders if their 
composite index falls within 6-12, Analyzers if their composite index falls within 13-23, 
and Prospectors if their composite index falls within 24-30. These three types of BS variables are 
indicator variables. Following Yuan et al. (2020), we also compute a categorical 
variable, Strategy_types, which indicates a value of 1 if the firm follows Defender BS, a value of 
2 if the firm follows Analyzer BS, and a value of 3 if the firm follows Prospector BS. Other related 
information, for example, stock return volatility, is collected from the daily CRSP database. We 
do not consider utility and financial firms (two-digit SIC codes: 49, 60-69) as they are highly 
regulated. We keep only US public firms. We report the distribution of our sample across industry 
and descriptive statistics of BS components, composite strategy, loan spread, and related control 
variables in Table 1.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Panel A provides the distribution of BS samples in each two-digit SIC coded industry. This 
sampling distribution across the industry is consistent with those reported in Bentley et al., 2013; 
Higgins et al., 2015; and Yuan et al., 2020. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for all six 
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variables used to compute our composite BS by each strategy type. The median score of the BS 
variable is 18, which is consistent with the literature. The raw components of BS variables of 
prospectors are significantly (p=0.001) different from those of defenders. Panel C provides 
descriptive statistics of regression variables (final sample for this study). On average, firms in our 
final sample pay approximately 212 basis points over the LIBOR for each dollar drawn drown, 
with a variation of about 142 basis points. We find that the strategy variable has a mean value of 
approximately 17.8 with a median value of 18 and a standard deviation of strategy is 3.4. 
(consistent with Bentley et al. (2013), Higgins et al. (2015), and Yuan et al. (2020)). The average 
firm size is approximately $5.5 billion, return on assets of about 2%, market-to-book of about 1.3, 
and 34% debt in their capital structure. Panel D presents the univariate analysis (mean difference 
t-test) of important loan features. We find that the mean loan spread for the Prospectors sub-group 
is 229.199 basis points, which is 18.481 basis points higher (statistically significant) than the rest 
of our sample with a mean loan spread of 210.718 basis points. We also observe a significant 
difference in other loan features between prospectors and other firms. 
We employ the following Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model to examine the 
impact of BS on the pricing of bank loans: 
𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝑺𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅)𝒊,𝒋,𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒚𝒋,𝒕 + 𝜸𝑭𝒊𝒓𝒎 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝒋,𝒕 + 𝜹𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝒊,𝒋,𝒕 +
𝝆𝑬𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝒋,𝒕 + 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒋,𝒕 (Eq. 1) 
In Eq. 1, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of loan spreads of the facility i of firm 
j, in industry k, at the year t. The higher value on the Strategy variable represents more IOBS. 
Following standard literature (e.g., Cai and Zhu, 2020; Ni and Yin, 2018; Parrino et al., 2005; 
Graham et al., 2008; Valta, 2012; Nadauld et al., 2012; and Chava, 2014), we consider three group 
of control variables step by step to rule out any concern about their potential impact in our study 
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(firm-level: size, return on assets, leverage, and market-to-book ratio; loan-level: deal amount, 
maturity, and other loan type and purpose dummies; executive-level: CEO age, gender, and 
tenure). We also count for the probable variations due to differences in industries and years. We 
cluster the standard errors at the firm level. However, β is our coefficient of interest which we 
expect to be positive and statistically significant to infer a negative impact of IOBS on the cost of 
bank loans. 
3. Result and discussion 
3.1 Main findings 
Table 2 reports the estimation results of our baseline model that links loan spreads to firms' 
BS and other known factors. Column (1) reports the results controlling firm-level variables, 
column (2) includes firm and loan-specific variables, and column (3) includes, in addition to firm-
specific and loan-specific controls, related CEO characteristics to avoid the concern that the effect 
of strategy variable is already absorbed by these control variables. The coefficient estimates in all 
the model specifications are positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level (t-
stistics=6.14 in column 1). These results support our main hypothesis that the cost of bank loans 
for a firm increases when it follows an IOBS. The results are economically meaningful. For 
example, based on the coefficient reported in column (1), when the Strategy score increases from 
the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, the loan spread increases by 6.7% (𝑒 . ∗ − 1), which 
is about 1.3% (0.067/5.085) relative to the mean loan spread. Our interpretation from this result is 
that when a firm changes its BS from the defender (cost-leadership) to prospector (innovation-
oriented), on average, the cost of bank loans increases by about 1.3% compared to the mean loan 
spreads. This result suggests that banks price their borrower strategic business orientation in setting 
loan spreads. 
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[Table 2 about here] 
We also create four dummy variables from the composite BS score: Defender, Analyzer, 
Prospector, and Prospector_pd. The results are reported in columns (4) to (7) of Table 2. The 
coefficient on Prospector is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that prospectors 
significantly pay higher loan spreads than defenders and analyzers. 
3.2 Business Strategy as corporate risk 
Here, we attempt to explain our main findings by investigating the riskiness of these firms. 
Innovative firms invest more in R&D, resulting in greater uncertainty and risk (Bentley et al., 
2013). Pandit et al. (2011) and Eberhart et al. (2008) also show a positive relation between R&D 
expenditure and firm-specific risk. Empirical evidence (e.g., Bradley et al., 2016; and Ni and Yin, 
2018) suggests that banks price firms’ risking taking by charging higher loan spreads. Based on 
this riskiness channel, we expect and find that banks charge higher loan spreads to innovative firms 
due to their higher risk-taking behaviors (we regress idiosyncratic risk, sales growth volatility, and 
operating performance volatility on strategy). Results are reported in Table 3.  
[Table 3 about here] 
3.3 Robustness check 
We conduct three sets of robustness analyses to check our main results. First, we re-estimate our 
baseline model using two different loan features other than the loan spreads (i.e., facility amount and 
number of covenants). Second, we use different model specification. Specifically, we run our baseline 
results using firm fixed effects instead of industry fixed effects. Third, we use an alternative definition of 
our key explanatory variable and use firm fixed effects in those models. Table 4 reports the results.  
[Table 4 about here] 
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Consistent with the idea that banks consider their borrowers' strategic business orientation 
in case of debt contacts by charging higher spreads, we also find that firms that follow IOBS face 
higher loan covenants and avail lower loan amounts than the Defenders. 
4. Conclusion 
Our main finding is that a firm that follows an IOBS (i.e., Prospector) pays significantly higher 
bank financing costs than Defenders or Analyzers. This study has important implications for firms 
that heavily depend on external debt financing. Specifically, the financially constrained firms need 
to be more cautious in formulating BS since banks might charge them higher loan spreads. If so, 
it would drive them to underinvestment and more unsatisfactory financial performance. However, 
the IOBS may also align with the interest of shareholders. Whether Prospectors enjoy a lower cost 
of equity is beyond the scope of this study. We leave this for future research. 
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Appendix A: Variable definition 
Variables Definitions Sources 
Spread 
 
The interest amount paid by borrowers annually over LIBOR in basis points 
(Allindrawn). 
Dealscan 
Upfront fee The upfront fee paid by borrowers for a loan Dealscan 
Maturity Maturity of a loan in a month Dealscan 
Loan amount Loan facility amount in millions of U.S. dollars Dealscan 
Secure loan A dummy variable, equal to 1 if the loan is a secure loan and 0, otherwise Dealscan 
Covenant 
A dummy variable, equal to 1 if the loan has either financial or general 






Composite score with values ranging from 6 to 30, where high (low) values 
in the continuum indicate prospector (defender) firms respectively, 






Alternative definition of key IDV, equal to 1 if STRATEGY score is 
between 6 and 12, equal to 2 if STRATEGY score is between 13 and 23, 




A dummy variable, equal to 1 if Strategy composite score is between 6 and 
12, and 0, otherwise 
Compustat 
Analyzer 
A dummy variable, equal to 1 if Strategy composite score is between 13 
and 23, and 0, otherwise 
Compustat 
Prospect 
A dummy variable, equal to 1 if Strategy composite score is between 24 
and 30, and 0, otherwise 
Compustat 
Prospect_pd 
A dummy variable, equal to 1 if Strategy composite score is between 24 









Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) 
scaled by total assets 
Compustat 
Leverage The ratio of total liabilities (dlc+dltt) to total assets (at) Compustat 




The standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items 
plus Depreciation and Amortization to lagged total assets over the previous 




The standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to 




The variance of the residual from the standard market model adjusted for 




The number of years that the current CEO has served in the firm as reported 
in the ExecuComp database 
ExecuComp 













Table 1: Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
This table reports industry affiliations, business strategy components, and summary statistics for measures of key variables used in 
this study. Panel A provides the number of firms with respect to their strategic business orientations in each two-digits SIC-coded 
industry. Panel B presents summary statistics for composite business strategy measure and its six components. Panel C provides 
summary statistics for all variables used for empirical tests in this study. Panel D presents the univariate analysis (mean difference 
t-test) of important loan features. Our final/regression sample consists of 28,038 firm-year observations with 4,367 unique firms 
covering the period of 1992-2017. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level. Appendix A provides 
more details of all variables. 
Panel A: Industry affiliation 








  N % N % N % 
01-09 Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 369 0.45 32 0.56 337 0.44 
10-14 Mining 4332 5.31 368 6.50 3964 5.22 
15-17 Construction 1144 1.40 60 1.06 1084 1.43 
20-39 Manufacture 43808 53.69 3162 55.82 40646 53.53 
40-48 Transport & communications 3804 4.66 329 5.81 3475 4.58 
50-51 Wholesale trade 4159 5.10 275 4.85 3884 5.12 
52-59 Retail trade 7320 8.97 288 5.08 7032 9.26 
70-89 Service 16040 19.66 1114 19.66 14926 19.66 
99 Others 621 0.76 37 0.65 584 0.77 
 
Panel B: Business strategy component 
Variable  
Full sample (N=81,597) 
 
Prospect 
(N=5,665) Analyzer (N=70,755) Defender (N=5,177) 
 Mean SD Median Median Median Median 
Strategy 17.94 3.63 18.00 25.00 18.00 11.00 
RDS5 0.36 11.28 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 
EMPS5 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
REV5 104.28 2,906 9.90 52.43 9.58 2.57 
SGA5 1.13 19.18 0.26 0.72 0.26 0.14 
EMPSTD5 1.15 5.04 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.05 
CAP5 0.27 0.22 0.21 0.11 0.21 0.38 
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Panel C: Regression variables 
Variable N Mean SD P25 P50 P75 
Allindrawn 28,038 211.683 142.180 100.000 200.000 275.000 
Ln (spreads) 28,038 5.085 0.816 4.605 5.298 5.617 
Strategy 28,038 17.780 3.425 15.000 18.000 20.000 
Strategy types 28,038 1.989 0.340 2.000 2.000 2.000 
Defender 28,038 0.064 0.244 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Analyzer 28,038 0.884 0.320 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Prospect 28,038 0.052 0.223 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Assets (bln) 28,038 5.522 13.953 0.302 1.131 4.014 
Firm size 28,038 6.985 1.913 5.711 7.031 8.298 
Roa 28,038 0.016 0.114 -0.000 0.035 0.069 
Leverage 28,038 0.340 0.227 0.186 0.311 0.458 
Market-to-book 28,038 1.336 0.861 0.793 1.082 1.596 
Upfront fee 6,236 53.411 72.293 12.500 35.000 75.000 
Ln (Upfront fee) 6,107 3.455 1.076 2.708 3.573 4.317 
Facility amount 28,038 351.21 591.48 36.79 135.00 400.00 
Ln (Facility amount) 28,038 4.714 1.730 3.605 4.905 5.991 
Maturity 28,038 47.545 22.214 35.000 59.000 60.000 
Ln (Maturity) 28,038 3.696 0.654 3.555 4.078 4.094 
Term loan 28,038 0.125 0.331 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Revolver 28,038 0.563 0.496 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Takeover 28,038 0.112 0.315 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LBO 28,038 0.021 0.142 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Merger 28,038 0.001 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Workcap 28,038 0.169 0.375 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Otherpr 28,038 0.003 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Debtrepay 28,038 0.151 0.358 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Corppurp 28,038 0.391 0.488 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
Panel D: Univariate analysis (mean difference t-test) 
Strategy Spreads Facility amount Covenant 
All others (1) 210.718  355.071 2.613 
Prospect (2) 229.199  281.100 2.716 
Diff [2-1] 18.481*** -73.971*** 0.103*** 
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Table 2: Main results 
This table presents our main results. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the interest amount paid by borrowers 
annually over LIBOR in basis points. The main variable of interest in the first three columns is Strategy. The strategy variable is a 
proxy for a firm’s business strategy that comes from a discrete score with values ranging from 6 to 30, where high (middle) [low] 
values indicate prospector (analyzer) [defender] firms, respectively. Model (1) controls for firm characteristics, model (2) controls 
for firm and loan characteristics, model (3) controls for the firm, loan, and board characteristics. In models (4) to (7), we also look 
for different strategy component dummies, and control variables are the same as in model (2). All variable definitions appear in 
Appendix A. The sample period is from 1992 to 2017. All model specifications include two-digits SIC coded industry and year 
fixed effects. T-statistics are computed using standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm-level and reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variable Ln (Spreads) 
        
Strategy 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.007***     
 (6.14) (4.20) (2.61)     
Defender    -0.017    
    (-0.63)    
Analyzer     -0.036*   
     (-1.85)   
Prospect      0.092***  
      (3.62)  
Prospect_pd       0.087** 
       (2.32) 
Firm size -0.225*** -0.128*** -0.118*** -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.129*** 
 (-38.69) (-18.04) (-12.04) (-17.82) (-17.78) (-17.87) (-7.09) 
ROA -0.743*** -0.879*** -1.082*** -0.911*** -0.911*** -0.897*** -0.970*** 
 (-13.85) (-16.82) (-10.41) (-17.57) (-17.56) (-17.26) (-8.52) 
Leverage 0.898*** 0.739*** 0.842*** 0.726*** 0.722*** 0.727*** 0.582*** 
 (26.40) (23.40) (15.77) (22.91) (22.64) (22.89) (8.17) 
Market-to-book -0.179*** -0.159*** -0.163*** -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.155*** -0.116*** 
 (-16.76) (-17.30) (-12.86) (-16.74) (-16.62) (-16.82) (-6.11) 
Ln(facilityamt)  -0.149*** -0.176*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.149*** -0.113*** 
  (-19.45) (-15.99) (-19.69) (-19.66) (-19.54) (-7.55) 
Ln (Maturity)  0.155*** 0.229*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.116*** 
  (14.71) (15.97) (14.78) (14.81) (14.74) (4.04) 
Term_Loan  -0.057*** 0.009 -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.057*** -0.073* 
  (-3.77) (0.41) (-3.80) (-3.82) (-3.82) (-1.85) 
Revolver  -0.189*** -0.208*** -0.190*** -0.190*** -0.190*** -0.181*** 
  (-18.79) (-14.79) (-18.87) (-18.89) (-18.87) (-7.07) 
Takeover  0.262*** 0.332*** 0.267*** 0.268*** 0.266*** 0.267*** 
  (12.11) (12.06) (12.40) (12.43) (12.30) (4.09) 
LBO  0.691*** 0.880*** 0.692*** 0.693*** 0.692*** 0.638*** 
  (16.19) (13.61) (16.23) (16.22) (16.21) (7.45) 
Merger  0.157 0.206 0.154 0.155 0.145 -0.088 
  (1.28) (1.39) (1.28) (1.29) (1.19) (-0.43) 
Workcap  0.038* 0.095*** 0.038** 0.038** 0.038* -0.027 
  (1.94) (3.62) (1.96) (1.97) (1.94) (-0.56) 
Otherpr  -0.050 -0.240 -0.053 -0.052 -0.048 0.303 
  (-0.48) (-1.51) (-0.51) (-0.51) (-0.47) (1.52) 
Debtrepay  0.120*** 0.192*** 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.122*** 0.053 
  (6.15) (7.00) (6.26) (6.27) (6.23) (1.04) 
Corppurp  -0.027 0.002 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.095** 
  (-1.54) (0.10)     
CEO Age   -0.002     
   (-1.56)     
Tenure   -0.005**     
   (-2.07)     
Female   0.005     
   (0.09)     
Constant 6.878*** 6.547*** 6.473*** 6.682*** 6.709*** 6.680*** 6.785*** 
 (102.36) (92.75) (50.29) (105.08) (101.77) (105.20) (39.49) 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 28038 28038 16480 28038 28038 28038 3252 
Adj. R2 0.462 0.548 0.590 0.547 0.547 0.548 0.490 
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Table 3: Business strategy and corporate risk  
 
This table presents the results on the relation between business strategy and corporate risk measures, proxied by idiosyncratic risk, 
the standard deviation of sales growth, and the standard deviation of return on assets. Idiosyncratic risk is the variance of the 
residual from the standard market model adjusted for nonsynchronous trading by adding five leads and lags of the market return. 
The key dependent variable is Strategy that comes from a discrete score with values ranging from 6 to 30, where high (middle) 
[low] values indicate prospector (analyzer) [defender] firms, respectively. All other independent variables are defined in Appendix 
A. The sample period is from 1992 to 2017. All model specifications include two-digits SIC coded industry and year fixed effects. 
T-statistics are computed using standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm-level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Idiosyn_risk Stdsalegrowth StdROA 
Strategy 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.002*** 
 (4.88) (13.76) (5.24) 
Firm size -0.295*** -0.023*** -0.012*** 
 (-47.04) (-9.30) (-16.50) 
ROA -2.209*** -0.309*** -0.375*** 
 (-27.81) (-8.34) (-27.08) 
Leverage 0.500*** 0.071*** 0.007 
 (9.38) (3.50) (1.05) 
Market-to-book -0.095*** -0.013*** 0.012*** 
 (-8.25) (-3.20) (8.68) 
Capex 0.207*** 0.336*** 0.028*** 
 (2.63) (6.76) (2.75) 
Constant 4.074*** -0.030 0.100*** 
 (46.66) (-0.82) (10.67) 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
N 26588 27772 27772 
Adj. R2 0.616 0.220 0.295 
 
Table 4: Robustness checks 
This table presents our robustness results. We conduct robustness tests from three main perspectives: 1. changing dependent 
variable, 2. changing model specification, and 3. changing independent variable and model specification. In the first two columns, 
we show the relationship between different loan features other than the loan spreads (i.e., the facility amount and the total number 
of loan covenants) and Strategy. In models (3) to (5), we use firm fixed effects instead of industry fixed effects in our main analysis 
(presented in Columns (1) to (3) - hereby C1 to C3) of Table2 – hereby T2). In models (6) to (8), we repeat models (3) to (5) using 
Strategy_types as the key independent variable instead of Strategy. Strategy_types is a categorical variable that takes value 1, 2, or 
3 if STRATEGY score is between 6 and 12, 13 and 23, 24 and 30, respectively. T-statistics are computed using standard errors 
corrected for clustering at the firm-level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Ln (facilityamt) Covenant Ln (Spreads) 
         
Strategy -0.015*** 0.010** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012***    
 (-4.44) (2.48) (3.21) (4.01) (3.19)    
Strategy types      0.051** 0.048** 0.062** 
      (2.15) (2.24) (2.21) 
         
Other Controls T2 C2 – facility  T2 C2 T2 C1 T2 C2 T2 C3 T2 C1 T2 C2 T2 C3 
         
Constant -0.406*** 1.979*** 6.724*** 6.631*** 6.329*** 6.759*** 6.684*** 6.358*** 
 (-3.04) (12.13) (53.66) (53.88) (32.17) (52.22) (53.28) (31.79) 
Industry FE Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Firm FE  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 28038 16428 28038 28038 16480 28038 28038 16480 
Adj. R2 0.670 0.287 0.642 0.703 0.719 0.642 0.702 0.718 
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